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In this Reply Brief, the parties will be referred to by the 
same names as in Appellants' initial Brief. 
This Brief articulates three (3) issues. They are: 
I. THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED AN IMPROPER STANDARD AND FAILED TO 
ADDRESS THE PROPER STANDARD IN DETERMINING GRANDPARENT VISITATION. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S LIMITATION ON VISITATION WAS UNDULY 
RESTRICTIVE AND IS NOT BASED ON ANY FINDING THAT THE LIMITED 
VISITATION WOULD BE IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE GRANDCHILDREN. 
III. THIS APPEAL IS NOT FRIVOLOUS OR WITHOUT MERIT AND IF 
THIS COURT AFFIRMS THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION, NO AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL SHOULD BE GRANTED TO THE APPELLEE. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED AN IMPROPER STANDARD AND FAILED TO 
ADDRESS THE PROPER STANDARD IN DETERMINING GRANDPARENT VISITATION. 
In this action, the Court concluded sua sponte that since the 
statute granting grandparent visitation (§ 30-5-2(1) Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended) was unconstitutional, the only 
visitation Boyd and Beverly were entitled to was that to which 
Janet stipulated. Janet argues that since the Court granted the 
visitation Janet stipulated to, the issue of the grandchildren's 
best interest was, by such stipulation, removed from the case. The 
argument is fallacious for two reasons: 
a. When the Court held the grandparent visitation statute was 
unconstitutional, it necessarily followed that the Court applied 
the wrong standard to determination of whether there should be 
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grandparent visitation. The Court concluded that Boyd and Beverly 
had no right to visit the grandchildren because the grandparent 
visitation statute was unconstitutional. The Court then was left 
to conclude, as it did, that only if Janet voluntarily allowed 
visitation would the Court grant visitation, and then only to the 
extent Janet stipulated to such visitation. It is apparent from 
this line of reasoning that had Janet refused to grant any 
visitation, the Court would have not ordered any visitation. 
It is clear from the decided cases that the courts must be 
guided by the humanitarian purpose of the statute and by the 
independent evaluation of the best interest of the grandchildren 
and not by what the mother of the grandchildren is willing to 
allow. (90 ALR 3d 222). 
In fact, in Goolsbee v. Heft (1977 Texas Civ. App.) 549 SW 2d 
34, the Texas Court expressly determined that the trial judge's 
power to grant visitation was not subject to the will of the 
parent, because otherwise the statute giving grandparent visitation 
in the best interest of the grandchildren would have been without 
effect. 
b. When the Court found the grandparent visitation statute 
unconstitutional, the issue of the best interest of the 
grandchildren was not then developed, articulated and applied by 
the Court in this case. The best interest of the grandchildren 
requires a three-pronged inquiry by the Trial Court. Those 
inquiries are: 
1. The wishes of the grandchildren; 
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2. The interaction and interrelationship of the 
grandchildren with their parents, siblings, and any other 
persons who may significantly affect the grandchildren's 
best interest; and 
3. The mental and physical health of all individuals 
involved. (90 ALR 3rd, p. 229) 
In this case, the Court never addressed these three 
considerations at all. In its Findings of Fact, the Court founds 
1. Some visitation of the children by the 
Plaintiffs will be beneficial and in the best interests 
and well-being of the children. (R. p. 79-82) 
This is a bald statement that offers no basis for the 
statement, how the statement was arrived at, why visitation would 
benefit the grandchildren, how visitation would benefit and be in 
the best interest of the grandchildren, or the extent to which 
visitation should be granted. The finding does not articulate any 
of the above three tests for determining the best interest of the 
grandchildren. This failure on the part of the Trial Judge is 
reversible error. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S LIMITATION ON VISITATION WAS UNDULY 
RESTRICTIVE AND IS NOT BASED ON ANY FINDING THAT THE LIMITED 
VISITATION WOULD BE IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE GRANDCHILDREN. 
Janet argues that the visitation granted by the Court is that 
requested by Boyd and Beverly and that Boyd and Beverly cannot, 
therefore, complain about the visitation. (See page 18 of Janet's 
Brief.) This argument is lacking in candor. This argument takes 
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one part of Boyd and Beverly's request in isolation from their 
other requests. For example, the argument ignores Request No. 1, 
which is requests: 
1. One (1) twenty-seven (27) hour period every 
other week, preferably from 6:00 p.m. Friday night to 
9:00 p.m. on Saturday night. If the children have 
church, school or recreational activities or music 
lessons during this time, Campbells will see that the 
children involved attend all such activities. 
Boyd and Beverly's requests for visitation must be taken in 
their totality. The order of the Court is so restrictive as to 
make it virtually impossible for Boyd and Beverly to be with all of 
the grandchildren at the same time or even separately, frequently 
enough and for a long enough time on each visitation to enable Boyd 
and Beverly to establish a meaningful relationship with the 
grandchildren and help the grandchildren to understand their 
father's family and its values. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the importance of the 
extended family and particularly of grandparent/grandchild 
relationships. In Grizwold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 
1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), the Court talks of "respect for the 
teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic values 
that underlie our society." In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 
Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977), (case 
which held unconstitutional a city zoning ordinance prohibiting a 
grandmother from allowing two grandsons to stay in her apartment) 
the Court further elaborates that these societal values include 
"the tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins and especially 
grandparents ..." and explains that the Constitution "protects the 
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sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the 
family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." 
III. THIS APPEAL IS NOT FRIVOLOUS OR WITHOUT MERIT AND IF 
THIS COURT AFFIRMS THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION, NO AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL SHOULD BE GRANTED TO THE APPELLEE. 
The applicable statute governing an award of attorney's fees 
is § 78-27-56, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. Under that 
statute, an award of attorney's fees can be made against a 
prevailing party "... if the Court determines that the action or 
defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted 
in good faith ..." 
This appeal directly challenges the Trial Judge's incorrect 
application of the standard of review appropriate in determining 
grandparent visitation. In allowing his personal views of U.C.A. 
§30-5-2 to influence his decision, Judge Low committed reversible 
error which is valid justification for appeal "warranted by 
existing law" and made "based on a good faith argument". Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33. Judge Low had discretion in 
deciding whether visitation should be awarded, but he was also 
bound by the requirement that he "minister to the needs of the 
children according to an enlightened and objective evaluation of 
the circumstances." Ehrlich v. Ressner, (1977) 55 App. Div 2d 953, 
391 NYS 2d 152. Also, that he follow the statute and determine 
grandparent visitation based on the best interest of the 
grandchildren. 
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In the case at barf Judge Low allowed his personal view on the 
constitutionality of U.C.A. §30-5-2 to color his focus away from 
what is actually in the best interest of the Campbell children. By 
applying the incorrect standard of review, the Trial Judge set a 
visitation schedule on a basis other than the basis required by 
§ 30-5-2(1) Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, and which does 
not constitute an arrangement of visitation which is in the best 
interest of the children involved. 
This appeal is motivated solely by Boyd and Beverly's desire 
to insure a result that is in the best interest of their 
grandchildren. They contend it is in the best interest of the 
grandchildren to know and learn from their grandparents since their 
father is not available to influence the grandchildren and teach 
them his families' values. Janet argues that Boyd and Beverly's 
dissatisfaction over the visitation awarded was based on a desire 
to be allowed free reign of the children without consulting or 
involving Janet. Boyd and Beverly specifically deny this 
allegation. Their concern is exclusively for their grandchildren 
and the desire to continue a meaningful, close family relationship 
with them. Because they feel the visitation awarded will not 
result in such relationship and is not conducive to the goal of 
achieving the best interest of the children set forth in the 
statute, they appeal the decision of the lower Court. This appeal 
is warranted, with merit, and motivated solely for the purpose of 
accomplishing what is in the best interest of their grandchildren. 
This objective was not achieved in the lower Court, therefore the 
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lower Court decision should be reversed and no attorney's fees 
should be awarded. 
Appellants submit there is no basis in fact or law for a 
finding by the Court that their appeal is without merit and not 
brought or asserted in good faith. Appellee's request for 
attorney's fees is without merit and should be denied by this 
Court. 
CONCLUSION 
In the instant case, the Trial Court applied an improper 
standard for determining grandparent visitation and failed to 
address the correct standard. The Trial Judge allowed his personal 
views of the applicable statute to taint his decision and as a 
result, failed to address the objective set forth in the statute, 
that of achieving an arrangement which is in the best interest of 
the children involved. The error constitutes reversible error. 
The statute is concerned exclusively with the children's 
welfare. Judge Low, believing the statute to unconstitutionally 
impinge on the mother's rights, granted only the extent of 
visitation stipulated to by the mother, Janet. This action almost 
wholly disregarded any analysis of what would actually be in the 
best interest of the children. This error constitutes a basic 
disregard for the purpose of the grandparent visitation statute, 
that of benefitting the children involved. 
This appeal is made on the good faith belief that reversible 
error was committed in the lower Court when it applied the 
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incorrect standard of review as set forth in U.C.A. §30-5-2(1). 
Because the appeal has merit and was not brought or asserted in bad 
faithf and because clear and substantial error was made, Boyd and 
Beverly respectfully request this Court deny Appellee's request for 
attorney's fees and remand this Case to the Trial Court for a new 
trial before a different Judge who can hear and determine the 
statutory and factual issue without bias and with the best interest 
of the Campbell grandchildren in mind. 
DATED this 23rd day of June, 1994. 
Respectfully submittedf 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
L. Brent Hoggan 
Attorneys for AppeMarfts 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) exact copies of the 
foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS, to Defendant's Attorney, 
Dianne R. Balmain, at 110 North 100 East, P. 0. Box 543, Loganf 
Utah 84323-0543, postage prepaid in Logan, Utah, this 23rd day of 
June, 1994. 
L. Brent Hoggan 
8 
